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Walter Otto Ötsch and Jakob Kapeller
Perpetuating the Failure:  
Economic Education and the Current Crisis
While the current financial crisis had an overwhelming impact on the global economy, its effect on economics 
as an academic discipline has been negligible. This paper explores the relationship between the financial crisis, 
mainstream economic theory and the education of economists. In a nutshell it shows that (a) current economic 
education leaves students illiterate with respect to events like the financial crisis, (b) mainstream economic 
theory is unable to systemically explain the financial crisis and (c) this situation will be unaffected by the recent 
events. On the contrary economic education will stay pretty much the same, since it incorporates a set of ideas, 
perceived as influential, well-established and important by the economic community.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of the current financial crisis in Sep-
tember 2008 (the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers fol-
lowed by a successive collapse of the interbank market, 
which lead to a decrease in credit-induced demand 
and GDP) was a surprise not only for the lay public, 
but also for most professional economists and other 
experts. Dirk Bezemer (2009), for instance, has identi-
fied only 13 experts, who successfully anticipated the 
current crisis in or before 2006. Additionally also the 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) in Basel had 
a premonition of the current financial crisis (e.g. Brio 
and Lowe 2002).
This collective failure of the economics’ profession 
(Colander et al. 2009), which was accompanied by a 
no less systemic malfunction of business journalism 
(Starkmann 2009), is comprehensible from a critical 
viewpoint on established economic theory. In sharp 
contrast to other social sciences, economic theory 
is, as is well known, arranged around an authorita-
tive theoretical core, commonly termed neoclassical 
economics (see: Dobusch and Kapeller 2009). The neo-
classical approach thereby dominates the economics’ 
profession. Hence, most economists are committed to 
one of the several variants of neoclassical economics 
(roughly 80% of the economists organized within the 
Verein für Sozialpolitik avow themselves to neoclas-
sical economics; see: Frey, Humbert and Schneider 
2007). In this spirit one may interpret the failure of 
academic economists to predict and thoroughly ana-
lyze the current economic crisis as a severe defect of 
the neoclassical paradigm.
2. Basic problems of economics education
While neoclassical economic research is a relatively 
broad and manifold domain, at least within certain 
paradigmatical boundaries, the teaching of economic 
theory suffers from a much narrower perspective. Eco-
nomic education almost always starts with and focus-
es on (variants of) the core of neoclassical theory: the 
supply and demand framework and the General Equi-
librium Theory in the tradition of Arrow and Debreu 
(both are formally equivalent; see below). The basic 
features of these models also define the core elements 
of economic education. This self-imposed limitation 
characterizes all leading economic textbooks, which 
basically serve as an introduction to General Equilib-
rium Theory.
In this sense a basic problem of economic educa-
tion is its nearly exclusive focus on just one theoreti-
cal conception, respectively paradigm. This rather 
narrow approach seems somehow tenuous, since the 
problems tackled by economics are similar to that 
of the other social sciences with respect to the fact 
they are contingent in time and space: general laws 
or basic propositions holding for all economies at 
a given time or for just one economy over all times 
seem, thus, improbable to find. This manifoldness 
associated with the problems of the social sciences, 
including genuine economic problems, demands a 
variety of perspectives on these problems and hence 
also a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches 
in academic teaching and research. In short, while 
multidimensional problems would also require multi-
dimensional theoretical answers, modern economics 
mainly relies on one unique perspective for analyzing 
economic problems, namely the perspective of neo-
classical economics. This lack of pluralism is especially 
problematic when it comes to economic education.
This argument corresponds with the citation habits 
of leading mainstream journals: theoretical perspec-
tives deviating from the mainstream economists’ at-
titude (like institutional, post-Keynesian or evolution-
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ary approaches) are not discussed within neoclassical 
research (cf. Kapeller 2010). In contrast, they are near-
ly completely neglected by mainstream economists 
leading to tight paradigmatical borders between com-
peting fields of research and, thus, reducing the scope 
of the debate within mainstream economics. 
When it comes to economics education these bor-
ders are even tighter than in economic research (see 
also: Wilson and Dixon 2009). Additionally, they are 
also more problematic in the context of education 
and teaching, since the basic lectures in economics 
are delivered to a wide audience of students ranging 
from Law to Business Administration and Sociology. 
Thus, these basic lectures shape not only the ideas of 
future economists, but also those of a broader intel-
lectual elite, which later occupies important positions 
in economy and society (like managers, government 
officials, business journalists or college teachers).
Most of these students only take a few lectures in 
economics before going into business, law, journal-
ism or pedagogics. Regrettably, most of them have 
not been exposed to a greater variety of neoclassical 
models, not to speak of alternative theoretical concep-
tions, during their economic education. Thus, these 
rather parochial basic lectures have a strong impact 
on shaping what educated people generally think 
about markets, consumption, economic growth or 
simply “the economy”.
Moreover, economic teaching is not only exhibiting 
a monist attitude when it comes to issues of theoreti-
cal diversity, but neoclassical economics also presents 
itself as a primarily ahistorical scientific endeavor 
thereby further limiting its conceptual variety. Many 
economists are receptive for an ahistorical view on 
economic issues, since they themselves have in many 
cases only little knowledge on economic history or 
the history of economic reasoning.
The common trend that courses devoted to these 
fields have been marginalized within the economics 
education (Chang 2004) is already reflected in a panel-
survey on the attitudes of German-speaking econo-
mists: While in 1981 85% of the profession believed 
that business cycles could only be understood in 
conjunction with the general historical development, 
in 2006 77% principally agreed on the statement 
that “inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon” 
(Frey, Humbert and Schneider 2007, 368-369). This 
corresponds to the idea, that business cycles can be 
modelled without any reference to historical events 
by using the standard equilibrium-approach. Conse-
quently economic history or the history of economic 
thought (which do not even appear in any question 
of the 2006-survey cited here) is thought to be unin-
spiring or unnecessary for understanding real-world 
economic problems.
Moreover, this narrow focus has successively led to 
the exclusion of the “big economic questions” from 
economics curricula, because the latter are strongly 
tied to the economics department’s research practice:
“These include questions such as whether capital-
ism or socialism is preferred, what the appropriate 
structure of an economy is, whether the market 
alienates people from their true selves […]. These 
‘big think’ questions are ones that are worthwhile 
to teach, but are generally no longer included in 
the economics major because they don’t fit the dis-
ciplinary research focus of the profession.” (Colan-
der and McGoldrick 2009, 6)
Similarly important national and international (pol-
icy-)institutions, like parliaments, central banks, the 
IMF, or even financial markets, are mostly neglected 
trough-out the economics curriculum. Economic 
teaching nowadays instead focuses on mathematical 
and statistical training to allow economic apprentices 
joining the paradigm-specific debates by embodying 
advanced formal and econometric techniques as is put 
best by a classic piece on the sociology of economics:
“The young Econ[omist], or ‘grad’, is not admitted 
to adulthood until he has made a ‘model’ exhibit-
ing a degree of workmanship acceptable to the el-
ders of the ‘dept’ in which he serves his apprentice-
ship. […] If he fails to do so , he is turned out of the 
‘dept’ to perish in the wilderness.” (Leijonhufvud 
1973, 329-330)
Consequentially also introductory textbooks further 
strengthen this attitude by focusing on economic 
models, instead of economic history or (real-world) 
economic statistics: most pedagogic examples do 
not rely on statistical data but on fictious values in-
vented at the desk of the textbook-author in order to 
fit the courageous assumptions necessary for develop-
ing the respective economic model (Benicourt 2005, 
Ötsch 2009).
As a result of this increasingly one-sided education 
young economists in the German-speaking area have 
a much stronger confidence in neoclassical econom-
ics than their older counterparts, who were exposed 
to different research paradigms and interdisciplinary 
courses on economic history or sociological theory 
during their education (Frey, Humbert and Schneider 
2007, 362-363). In his recent book David Colander 
(2009) argues that the tendency to substitute Europe’s 
traditional curricular forms in economics for their US-
counterparts is further narrowing and weakening eco-
nomics as an intellectual endeavour.
3.  The role of textbooks in 
economics education 
Economic textbooks are powerful devices, which serve 
as the main vehicle for the international standardiza-
tion of economic education. While there exists in prin-
ciple a broad variety of different economic textbooks, 
a closer examination shows that the collection of top-
ics covered as well as their specific treatment follow 
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a rather standardized routine, rather independent of 
the concrete author or publisher (Stiglitz 1988, Lee 
and Keen 2004, Grimes 2009; for notable exceptions 
see section 6) “As a result most new textbooks are, 
generally speaking, clones of existing ones.” (Hill and 
Myatt 2007, 58)
The typical textbook starts with a discussion of 
some fundamental principles and then turns immedi-
ately to the supply and demand framework. The intend-
ed purpose of this model according to its apologists is 
to show “how markets work”, i.e. to illustrate the basic 
idea of the “market mechanism”. Additionally, the mod-
el of perfect competition is developed mostly by utiliz-
ing three distinct parts: the theory of the household, 
the firm and the market. While the supply-demand 
scheme is applied to a series of simple examples, sug-
gesting it is a generic tool for an analysis of markets, 
the model of perfect competition is presented as a spe-
cial case based on overly narrow assumptions. In fact, 
the perfect competition model is a popularization of 
the General Equilibrium Theory of Arrow and Debreu. 
While the latter is highly formal in nature, the former 
represents a simplified, often diagrammatic, textbook-
version of the theory, which can be understood as an 
introduction to General Equilibrium Theory.
While most textbooks differentiate between the 
supply and demand scheme and the model of per-
fect competition on a rhetorical level, they are, in 
fact, formally equivalent. Therefore “both” models 
can be depicted by the well-known supply-demand 
scheme, it is the main illustration of the neoclassical 
paradigm’s core. Generally many neoclassical econo-
mists believe that the supply-demand model and/or 
the model of perfect competition resemble the gen-
uine “market-mechanism”, as the single most impor-
tant mechanism working in any economy. Mankiw’s 
prominent Principles-textbook, for instance, depicts 
the supply-demand schedule 91 times on 850 pages 
(Mankiw 2001, reference is made to the German edi-
tion). In none of these 91 cases it is discussed whether 
the institutional preconditions regarding the applica-
bility of model are fulfilled, maybe because this ques-
tion is anything but easy to answer (see Ötsch 2009, 
Chapter 6). In all textbooks the supply demand model 
and/or the model of perfect competition is broadly 
applied to markets where the assumptions are plainly 
untrue (e.g. to the effect of taxes in cigarettes in USA, 
a market with only four firms). Consequently there is 
no discussion whether this model can be used at all or 
how to evaluate empirical evidence against different 
models. In this spirit Hill und Myatt (2007, 58) discuss 
an  “overemphasis on perfectly competitive markets 
in microeconomics principles textbooks”. 
Completing the model of perfect competition 
marks the halfway point of nearly all textbooks (many 
courses don’t spend much time on the second half of 
the text-books). Subsequently other types of markets 
are discussed, like monopoly or oligopoly and the fi-
nal chapters usually deal with factor markets and oth-
er topics like the role of government. But references 
are always made to the model of perfect competition 
as a ready-to-use hermeneutical tool and a benchmark 
for policy decisions. In this spirit “it is not surpris-
ing that the perfectly competitive framework is seen 
by many students as synonymous with the microeco-
nomic analysis of markets” (Hill and Myatt 2007, 60).
The uniform features in economic textbooks dis-
cussed here could have historical reasons as well. The 
first prominent textbook in USA after WWII was that 
of Paul A. Samuleson (starting in 1948, see also: Col-
ander and McGoldrick 2009, 31-32; Skousen 1997). Eco-
nomic textbooks up to now are mostly structured af-
ter the Samuelsonian archetype, covering very similar 
material presented in a very similar mode.  The Samu-
elsonian classic focused on presenting simple formal 
models of economic mechanisms, which were at the 
core of the text, combined with vague and sketchy 
real-world examples, to give some intuition about the 
supposed explanatory value of the models. Samuel-
son thereby was well aware of the fact that defining 
economics’ core knowledge via a widely distributed 
standard textbook may have an impressive societal 
impact: “I don‘t care who writes a nation‘s laws, or 
crafts its treatises, if I can write its economics text-
books.“ (Samuelson, quoted in Skousen 1997, 150)
The Samuelsonian focus on simple diagrammatic 
models, in some cases backed up by a little algebra, as 
the core and fundament of any economic education 
has been perpetuated till the 21st century. Such an ap-
proach is, perfectly compatible with an emphasis on 
the simple diagrammatic version of General Equilib-
rium Theory as discussed above, which was forced by 
the influential “Chicago School of Economics” as well.
Many publishers of modern textbooks tend to 
further enforce this tendency of a self-reproducing 
teaching-standard, since most new textbooks are sub-
ject to a thorough peer-review process. In this context 
textbook-authors report that already minor changes 
in the standard presentation (e.g. terminological 
changes), are regarded as conceptual flaws by the re-
viewers (having the standard Samuelsonian-Chicago 
conception of a textbook in mind) and causes publish-
ers to demand changes by the authors. If the authors 
refuse to make the demanded alterations publishers 
reduce the marketing spending associated with a cer-
tain textbook (thereby reducing the authors’ income) 
or drop the project as a whole.1 
1 At the 2010 ASSA-conference in Atlanta David Colander repor-
ted of heavy objections against his move to change the name 
of the „Aggregate Demand Curve“ in his intermediate mac-
roeconomics-textbook to „Aggregate Equilibrium Curve“ for 
reasons of consistency (see also: Colander 1995). Consequently 
his publisher threatened to „turn the book down“, which lead 
Colander to use the traditional label.
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Moreover, there are also rather practical reasons for 
the popularity of standard economic textbooks: They 
are, from an economic perspective, rather cheap, i.e. 
“efficient”, when used to prepare economic lectures, 
since economists already know the relevant models in 
depth and just have to adapt this knowledge to the pre-
sentation in the textbook. Additionally, there is a lot 
of auxiliary material accompanying those textbooks, 
like ready-made power point slides for presenting the 
material in class, specific “teacher-editions” of text-
books or various web-based resources like data-bases 
with exam-questions and their respective answers.
Peter Grimes (2009) investigated the question why 
the alternative “social issues”-approach to economic 
theory, which puts problems instead of models at the 
centre of academic teaching, has not succeeded in re-
placing the traditional mode of acquiring economic 
skills. His main conclusion (Grimes 2009, 96) is that 
“after a while, the marginal cost of preparing to teach 
a traditional principles class drops toward zero while 
the marginal cost of preparing to teach a social issues 
course remains relatively high.” Thus, economic text-
books also function as a kind of “labor-saving device”, 
which allows for a reduction of time spent in prepara-
tion for courses. This is, of course, beneficial for the 
individual scientist since “when asked about the im-
portance of teaching versus research in promotion de-
cisions at major universities, one hears that practice 
dictates 90 to 95 percent of the decision based on 
research output.” (Colander and McGoldrick, 2009, 28) 
Devoting only a minimal amount of time to teaching 
preparation is thus an immediate imperative for the 
ambitious researcher, thereby reassuring that the stan-
dard textbook will be her or his preferred choice and 
guideline.
4.  Failures of neoclassical textbook 
reasoning
The neoclassical focus in economic education has a va-
riety of different effects. Among other things it may 
illuminate, why economists and similarly educated 
professionals (speculators on financial markets, busi-
ness journalists…) were not only unable to predict the 
financial crisis, but, moreover, believed that such an 
event was possible at all (for the prognoses of German 
research institutes, see the list in Nienhaus 2009, 19). 
In our opinion, neoclassical textbooks economics lacks 
the essential tools to explain why capitalist economies 
are, to some extent, prone to crises in general and fi-
nancial crises in particular. 
This claim may seem somehow odd, since, as already 
mentioned, neoclassical research contains a broad 
spectrum of models, some of them especially devoted 
to explaining the notoriously unstable behavior of 
financial markets (e.g. Hart and Kreps 1986, De Long 
et al. 1990). While such contributions are sometimes 
even prominently discussed and highly cited, they in-
troduce new assumptions or modify already existing 
ones and, thus, deviate from the simple textbook ex-
ample (while preserving many of its core ideas). Hence, 
they are (a) not taught within the standard curricu-
lum leaving the vast majority of students unaware of 
their implications and (b) only familiar to small circles 
within the economic community, which are especially 
considered with the instability of prices (on financial 
markets).2 
But the majority of professional economists follows 
those theoretical concepts which are in line with the 
standard textbook reasoning. Well-known examples 
are the main models in modern finance, like (1) the effi-
cient market hypothesis – it declares financial markets 
as always in equilibrium -, (2) the capital asset pricing 
model – it defines the main relationship between risk 
and return, (3) the Modigliani-Miller theorems – which 
say that the way in which a firm finances its real activi-
ties does not affect the cost of capital, i.e. finance can 
be separated in some way from production activities 
– and (4) the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing mod-
els which underlies a broad range of concrete calcula-
tions e.g. in derivative markets. All of them are in line 
with the Arrow-Debreu model of General Equilibrium, 
the core model of neoclassical textbook economics. In 
this context it seems appropriate to illuminate some 
of the central deficits in this reasoning. 
4.1 The concept of the actor
Neoclassical economics rests on two basic concepts: (1) 
of man as a fully rational, but socially isolated agent, 
and (2) of the “market” as a central coordination de-
vice of economic activities. Both are based on a strict 
reductionism: social phenomena as such are, more or 
less, inexistent, since they are always explained by 
referring to individual behavior (methodological indi-
vidualism, firms are modelled analogous to single per-
sons or households, see: Ötsch 2009, Chapter 5). The 
explanatory capability of the neoclassical approach is, 
thus, inevitably linked to the suitability of its concep-
tion of the individual actor.
Regrettably the concept of human actor in neoclas-
sical economics is fairly limited. It is considered as 
a information processing machine (Mirowski 2002): 
data from the outer world, e.g. prices in markets, are 
processed by an “inner” program, the results are per-
ceived as “behavior” in the outer world. Therefore, the 
agent follows a simple “stimulus-reaction”-scheme 
(Blaseio 1986). 
Such an approach is only plausible if the “internal 
program” is constant and immutable over time. It 
serves as a stable transformational field, which guar-
antees the conversion of external data into a unique 
and unambiguous result. Thereby the “internal pro-
2 We have to thank one of our reviewers for a hint on this specific 
debate.
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gram” consists only of a set of preferences and a 
processing algorithm (e.g. “maximize”!). Preferences, 
thus, occupy a central and decisive role in the neoclas-
sical image-of-man, they define him or her.
But the concept of preferences is based on very 
restrictive assumptions (Ötsch 2009, Chapter 4). For 
instance, they do not change (neither through time 
nor through interaction with others, see: Fullbrook 
2005) or they are not subject to any social, societal 
or cultural influence (Wolfson 1994). In textbooks 
preferences are mostly explained by discussing some 
rudimentary assumptions, which are, in turn, illus-
trated by fictitious examples (Benicourt 2005).
Moreover, most of these restrictive assumptions 
contradict conventional knowledge concerning hu-
man cognition (as found in cognitive sciences) and 
the implications of cultural conditions for individual 
behavior (as found in cultural sciences). Individuals 
in neoclassical theory act like human calculators or 
like computers running a very simple software, which 
is stable, exogenously given and does not change in 
response to different circumstances. People in neo-
classical basic models cannot alter their models. They 
have no ability to reflect themselves, to adapt their 
mental models and to learn. “Behavior” of this kind 
has nothing to do with real human actions as they ap-
pear in the normal course of life. Additionally, there 
is, of course, no self-reflection or reflection about 
the world or the economy – the individuals in neo-
classical economic theory have no self-image and no 
self-consciousness (they are automata, like animals in 
Descartes’ world view).
4.2 The concept of market
The basic idea of the market is represented by the 
supply-demand schedule, where the price of a com-
modity is determined by the intersection of supply 
and demand (see figure 1(a)). But even this seemingly 
simple model is based on a series of far-reaching as-
sumptions, which are well-known to specialists but 
not mentioned in almost all introductory textbooks.
A prominent example is the so-called stability prob-
lem. It asks whether a market starting from a situa-
tion where supply (S) does not equal demand (D), e.g. 
at price P
1
 in figure 1(a), can reach equilibrium (Q*) by 
itself. In Figure 1(a) this seems no problem. If at price 
P
1
 supply S exceeds demand D then it could be plausi-
bly argued that producers lower the price. This would 
induce growing demand and shrinking supply. So the 
market would “move” along the arrows and finally ar-
rive at a stable equilibrium. Here we have a price P* 
which corresponds with a quantity Q* where supply 
equals demand.  














But the dynamic feature of the market strongly de-
pends on the actual form of the supply and demand 
curves. Figure 1(a) represents the “standard case”: 
as the market price rises, supply grows and demand 
decreases. But the shape of these curves depends on 
many further assumptions inside the model. For in-
stance, we have to assume increasing average costs, 
which does not hold for many empirical cases, in order 
to preserve a well-behaved supply curve as depicted 
by figure 1(a). In figure 1(b) we look at a specific de-
mand curve. If at a price P
1
, where supply exceeds de-
mand, firms lower price then the supply surplus would 
rise further and further. Thus, the market shown in 
figure 1(b) is notoriously unstable and cannot reach 
any equilibrium-state. 
On a more general level we can ask which condi-
tions must be fulfilled, to exclude the possibility of 
“global instability” in a general equilibrium framework 
(with all its idiosyncratic assumptions). This question 
has been discussed intensely for more than 50 years 
(for an overview see Costa 1998, 78ff.) leading to a de-
finitive result: global instability can only be excluded 
if we impose further restrictive assumptions on the 
structure of preferences, e.g. we must assume (a) that 
all households have the same preferences, which im-
plies they are identical, or (b) react in the same way 
to changing income (Keen 2002, 45f.). Of course, these 
assumptions are not empirically justified. Hence, it is 
unsurprising to note that “the results […] concerning 
global stability are unquestionable negative.” (Ingrao 
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and Israel 1990, 361) Neoclassical theory, thus, does 
not show “how real markets work”. At its best the sup-
ply and demand framework is an inspiring heuristic 
for analyzing price-quantity relations on certain mar-
kets (this can be achieved by dropping all background 
assumptions), at its worst it shows an utopian image 
of an ideal market with a strong ideological aftertaste.
The stability discussion and its far-reaching conse-
quences are seldomly mentioned in microeconomic 
textbooks. A notable exception is the textbook of 
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). But while it 
explains the main theorems of the stability problem, 
it drastically understates its importance: “The center 
of our science”, the authors argue, is constituted by 
“the equations of equilibrium”. “The determination 
of dynamic laws of change” on the other hand is the 
main feature of “other sciences, such as physics or 
even ecology”, i.e. they are not relevant for economics 
(1995, 620). But restricting theory only to equilibrium 
points permits an explanation how these equilibria 
could be reached and, thus, dramatically restricts the 
scope of neoclassical equilibrium theory. 
But equilibrium points include unresolved puzzles 
as well. In the neoclassical model of perfect compe-
tition all agents (households and firms) follow prices 
given by “the market”. Nobody determines prices, 
this does “the market”. But who is the market? The 
“market” in this conception is an impersonal and 
anonymous authority, which exists independently 
of individual transactions and is not controlled 
or directed by any human entity. The condition 
“supply=demand”, which holds for market-clearing 
prices, is only a theoretical assertion without empiri-
cal confirmation. In fact, it is rather dubious, who or 
what determines prices in this context (it is not the 
market participants, because these only accept the 
given prices). Hence, “equilibrium prices” in economic 
models are mostly deduced directly from the relevant 
assumptions (e.g. that “markets are in equilibrium”, 
an assumption as utilized in theories on financial 
markets). What the theoretical concept of the market 
means from an empirical or institutional perspective 
remains fairly unclear: we simply do not know, what 
is meant by the neoclassical idea of the market when 
confronted with empirical and institutional settings 
of a given economy (it lacks appropriate correspon-
dence terms to translate between theory and reality; 
see: Nagel 1963, Ötsch 2009, Chapter 6).
4.3  Relation to the analysis 
of the current crisis
The arguments discussed in the two preceding subsec-
tions are a helpful guide to understand the weakness-
es of contemporary economic theory when it comes 
to predicting and/or analyzing the current financial 
crisis. Neoclassical agents live in a fixed reality. It can 
be perceived without any ambiguities. Moreover the 
collapse of the interbank-market in September 2008 
can be understood as a dramatic change in percep-
tions, interpretations and expectations. The mutual 
ideas and views central protagonists (banks, investors, 
speculators) had of each other have been drastically 
altered. As a result risky assets have been reevaluat-
ed on a broad scale. This sudden cleavage between 
planned actions, actual activities and blurry expecta-
tions led to strong imbalances and systematic disequi-
libria on various levels. In this context it is, of course, 
regrettable that the standard conception of the mar-
ket is based on the idea of a stable, self-regulated equi-
librium and, thus, unsuitable to analyze situations of 
systemic imbalances and irregularities. 
Moreover, this concept of the market is free from 
any historical connotations: historical knowledge on 
financial crisis (e.g. Kindleberger 1978) or the idea 
to distinguish between different historical episodes 
with different decisive characteristics (e.g. current 
financial capitalism as opposed to fordism) is, thus, 
simply inapplicable in the ahistorical model world of 
contemporary economics. From this perspective it is 
not surprising that mainstream economists couldn’t 
foresee the upcoming crisis (they also couldn’t pre-
dict or systemically explain the subprime-crisis, 
which started in 2007 with similar, but smaller, ef-
fects as compared to the current crisis). For instance, 
the original general equilibrium model does not in-
clude money (it cannot even be integrated into this 
approach, see: Ötsch 2009, 269ff), therefore, it shows 
a “capitalism” without money. Most macroeconomic 
models used for prognoses do not include financial 
wealth and banks interacting with real sectors (promi-
nent examples are the Washington University Macro 
Model with 600 variables used in US politics, or the 
Small Global Forecasting Model used by the OECD, see 
Bezemer 2009, 18ff.). Most models dealing with finan-
cial markets follow the efficient market hypothesis. It 
says that all relevant information is included in actual 
market prices. This implies that nobody could achieve 
permanent gains from financial markets and (that’s 
included in its strong version) bubbles could not be 
possible at all.
In all these widely used models crises do not appear 
since the focus is on the self-regulatory capacities of 
the market. This habitual overemphasis systematically 
blinds economists: they simply do not recognize (any-
more) that crises and bubbles are an essential feature 
of capitalist economies and, thus, there is no econom-
ic toolbox to analyze, let alone predict, financial crisis 
as the current one.
5.  Effects of the current financial crisis 
on the teaching of economics
Contrasting the path-dependent aspects explored in 
section three with the recent experiences from the 
current financial crisis might lead to the conclusion 
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that this major historical event would also be consid-
ered as a crisis of neoclassical reasoning. While some 
economists (and non-economists) have articulated 
critical statements against mainstream economic 
theory3, this is still a minority position. In spring 
2009, for instance, 83, mostly elder, German econo-
mists issued a critical statement for more realism in 
analyzing economic policies, thereby arguing against 
modern macroeconomics (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, April 27, 2009). But the opposite viewpoint 
gained support from 188 economists (Handelsblatt, 
June 8, 2009) who argued in favor of “internationally 
competitive“ economic theories. 
The majority of economists do not consider the ac-
tual crisis as a crisis of economics as well. Only some 
prominent economists (like Nobel prize winners Jo-
seph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, see Handelsblatt Jan-
uary 11, 2010) took the economic crisis as an occasion 
to criticize established economic reasoning. Evidently 
for most economists it is very hard if not impossible 
to get distance to their own thinking and detect a 
crisis of their paradigm. Their acquired knowledge in 
standard economic theory is still highly remunerated 
in the scientific community. In media, in prominent 
boards and as policy advicers we find the same neo-
classical economists as before the financial crisis, e.g. 
in the German expert advisory board on economic 
policy (Sachverständigenrat).
In this way there is no general debate on how to 
change economic education. In this spirit leading 
economic textbook authors comment on the issue as 
follows:
„Despite the enormity of recent events, the princi-
ples of economics are largely unchanged. Students 
still need to learn about gains from trade, supply 
and demand, the efficiency properties of market 
outcomes, and so on. These topics will remain the 
bread-and-butter of introductory courses.“ (Grego-
ry Mankiw)4
„More economic research (and teaching), not less, is 
the best hope of both emerging from the current 
crisis and of avoiding future ones.“ (Doug McTag-
gart, Christopher Findley und Michael Parkin)5
So contrary to what one would expect, leading text-
book authors don’t seem to recognize any necessity 
to change the basic commitments of economic educa-
tion. Instead, they recommend “more of the same”, i.e. 
a more intense education in economics; a claim that 
is sometimes even made for extending the existing 
3 As summarized by Nienhaus (2009). Collections on the current 
debates can be found on www.voxeu.org and www.blicklog.
com/finanzkrise/wissenschaft-und-medien.
4 see „That Freshman course Won’t be quite the same“, New York 
Times, [23 May 2009].
5 see entry „The State of Economics“ in East-Asia Forum, Mai 21, 
2009 online: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/05/21/the-
state-of-economics/, [10 July 2009].
body of economic education into the sphere of public 
schools to facilitate “rational” behavior and, hence, im-
prove economic performance (e.g. in Cassel 2004).
Another interesting occasion for observing the 
economic community’s reaction to the current finan-
cial in terms of teaching, was provided at the ASSA-
conference 2010 in Atlanta, where a panel of highly 
decorated economists (Benjamin Friedman - Harvard, 
Raghuram Rajan – Chicago, Robert Shiller – Yale, Alan 
Blinder – Princeton) was assembled in a session titled 
“How should the financial crisis change how we teach 
economics?” Interestingly, with the exception of Alan 
Blinder who presented plans for some minor changes 
in his macroeconomic textbook, none of the speakers 
made a single concrete suggestion on how to change 
economic education, economic curricula or econom-
ics’ basic pedagogical tools (diagrams, textbooks…). 
All panelists sticked to general, uncontroversial and 
vague statements such as: “economics should be prac-
tically useful for students” or “economics should be 
more realistic and care about institutions”. In sum, the 
session confirmed the impression that the basic fea-
tures of the economic education will stay as they are.
When looking more specifically for teaching mate-
rial devoted to explain the financial crisis within the 
standard economics curriculum one comes across 
tools like the “teaching note” of Stinespring and 
Kench (2009). This has been downloaded over 300 
times and frames the financial crisis as a prisoner’s 
dilemma, focusing solely on the interbank loan mar-
ket. In this context the current financial crisis is pre-
sented primarily as a crisis of trust between different 
banking institutions, thereby abstracting from the 
systemic reasons of the current financial crisis. Thus, 
also when it comes to explaining the current crisis to 
students, economists prefer to stay within the bound-
aries of standard neoclassical theory even if this, as 
in the current case, leads to a drastic oversimplifica-
tion of the matter at hand. So, altogether, the current 
financial crisis doesn’t seem to have any decisive im-
pact on the way economics is taught.6
6. Concluding remarks
Based on the arguments presented in the preceding 
sections some relatively clear-cut suggestions for the 
reform of economics curricula can be delineated. We 
will conclude this paper by discussing some major im-
plications of our argument so far.
First, it seems necessary to implement a pluralist ori-
entation within basic economic education: when stu-
6 Similar things can be said about the trends in economic re-
search: The widely disseminated paper of Colander et al. (2009) 
on the current crisis and the state of the economics profession 
basically recommends „more of the same“, i.e. more advanced 
mathematics, more sophisticated statistical techniques, more 
complex models and so on (see also the debate in the real-world 
economics review, issues 48-50).
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dents are introduced to different theoretical approach-
es they may debate their relative merits and develop 
an awareness about the weaknesses and strengths of 
competing theories and the inherent complexity of 
economic activities. In turn, they would possibly be 
more inclined (and also more able to) analyze given 
problems with methodological and theoretical instru-
ments appropriate to the questions at hand instead of 
using an invariable set of methods prescribed by tradi-
tion (for an overview of concrete suggestions for a plu-
ralistic economic education see: Elsner 2006, Reardon 
2009 or Rima 2011). Additionally, such a reform would 
favor (1) the return of the “big-think questions” to eco-
nomics’ curricula, i.e. those which make economics an 
interesting subject, (2) as well as a problem-centered 
approach to teaching economics.
Second, an economic education should supplement 
its core training by courses in related areas such as 
economic history, sociology, political science or phi-
losophy in order to provide students with some con-
text knowledge on economic systems (what is the his-
tory of an economy? where do its institutions come 
from? what’s the relation between economy and so-
ciety? …). The history of economic thought should, 
from our point of view, return to a central position 
within economic education: teaching students about 
the curious and idiosyncratic developments in eco-
nomic reasoning broadens their perspective and gives 
them a glimpse on the variety of solutions to ques-
tions regarding the “economy” developed over time. 
In any case this would be a more balanced treatment 
than providing students with extensive textbook-
knowledge, which is presumably based on current 
knowledge but in fact lags about 30-50 years behind.
Third, and maybe most important because institu-
tionally decisive, we would argue for the usage of a 
more balanced set of basic textbooks incorporating 
a broader variety of theoretical approaches (as: Stret-
ton 1999, Lavoie 2009 or Reardon 2009) or at least a 
broader perspective on established economic theory 
(as: Klamer et al. 2010). An even more recent example 
is given by the forthcoming textbook of Elsner et al. 
(2011), which is based on evolutionary and institution-
al approaches to microeconomics. 
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